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THE WALLS (AND WIRES) HAVE EARS:
THE BACKGROUND AND FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
AMERICO R. CINQUEGRANAt
On the afternoon of January 14, 1980, agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation recorded the following conversation between Vlad-
imir Sorokin, an official from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.,
and an unidentified caller.*
. . . . Vladimir Sorokin speaking.
Caller: Ah, I have something I would like to discuss with
you I think that would be very interesting to you.
Is there any way to do so in, in, in, ah, confidence or in
privacy?
Sorokin: Maybe you can, ah, name yourself?
Caller: Ah. . .ah, on the telephone it would not be wise.
Sorokin: I see.
I come from, I, I, I am in, with the United States
government.
The caller was determined later to have been Ronald W. Pelton, a
former employee of the National Security Agency, and the subject was
serious: espionage against the United States. This and other conversa-
tions that constituted critical evidence in the espionage prosecution of
Pelton** were acquired through electronic surveillance by the FBI
under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978. In light of the Act's tenth anniversary, this commentary discusses
the legal and political foundations for that statute, its contents, and the
consequences of its implementation. The commentary concludes by dis-
cussing the results of the Act's subjugation to judicial scrutiny since its
t Deputy Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Office of Intelligence Policy and Re-
view, United States Department of Justice. B.A. 1968, University of New Hampshire,
J.D. 1973 University of Virginia. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent those of the Justice Department.
* Full transcript on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
** United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct
1741 (1988).
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enactment, and several potential amendments that merit further consid-
eration by Congress.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA," "the
Act")' embodies legal principles developed over decades by the Su-
preme Court, Congress and the Executive, in their efforts to relate the
terms of the fourth amendment to electronic surveillance.2 The Act was
a product of years of debate concerning whether the President possessed
inherent constitutional authority to approve warrantless electronic sur-
veillance for national security purposes.'
The terms of the Act, its legal foundation, and its legislative his-
tory illustrate the competing interests and political principles that oper-
ate in a constitutional democracy in which power is shared among three
independent branches of government. Perhaps the most significant
product of the turmoil that engulfed the national security bureaucracies
in the 1970s, the Act attempts to apply domestic law enforcement prin-
ciples to activities conducted for national security purposes.
In crafting FISA, both Congress and the executive branch were
forced to compromise substantially in order to agree on an effective reg-
ulatory scheme. In this respect, FISA is a prime example of the differ-
ent perspectives and purposes that shape discussion of congressional
' Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2518-19 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
I See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1566, S.
REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1977); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1977: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1977) (state-
ment of Senator Kennedy); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976: Hearings
on S. 743, S. 1888 and S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1976) (state-
ments of Senators McClellan and Kennedy); Electronic Surveillance Within the United
States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1976); Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for For-
eign Intelligence Purposes: Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence
and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4-5 (1976) [hereinafter Electronic Surveillance Hearings] (statement of Sena-
tor Kennedy).
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regulation of executive branch activities in general, and intelligence ac-
tivities in particular. The genesis of FISA also highlights the uncer-
tainty caused by reliance on the judicial process to establish rules of
behavior for the executive branch, the influences shaping congressional
action, and the Executive's proclivity for occupying the power vacuums
that result from the ponderous nature of the legislative and judicial
processes.
Thus, review of the foundation, creation, and application of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act presents a basis for understanding
interbranch conflict and collaboration. This commentary will trace the
development of FISA through the painfully slow elaboration of legal
and political limits on controversial intelligence activities. Particular fo-
cus will be placed upon how the Executive makes use of the discretion
that is paced in its hands by default as a result of intermittent and often
confused judicial decisions and the lack of a congressional consensus.
Finally, as mentioned, a number of potential statutory improvements
are discussed.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Early Treatment of Electronic Surveillance
National security interests and electronic surveillance converged in
1918 when a criminal penalty was enacted to protect from espionage
the telephone system operated by the United States government during
World War ." Before 1918, and after the criminal penalty expired in
1919, warrantless wiretapping by the executive branch was a common
practice.5 It was not until 1928 that the issue came before the Supreme
Court, in Olmstead v. United States.6
Olmstead resulted in a sharp 5-4 division, with the Court favoring
the admissibility in a criminal trial of private telephone conversations
intercepted through wiretaps. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the ma-
jority, emphasized the fact that "voluntary conversations secretly over-
heard" could not be equated with material "things" seized by the gov-
ernment." Since the persons using the telephone intended to project
their words outside their homes, and there had been no physical intru-
' Act of October 29, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-230, ch. 197, 40 Stat. 1017, 1017-18.
' See Donnelly, Comments and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63
YALE L.J. 799, 799-800 (1954). In 1924 and 1928, Attorneys General Stone and Sar-
gent prohibited the Justice Department's Federal Bureau of Investigation from using
this technique on ethical grounds. See id.; Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra
note 3, at 23 (reprinted testimony of Attorney General Levi).
8 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7 Id. at 464.
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sion, the Court held that this mode of acquisition was not regulated by
the fourth amendment.'
The majority, rejecting an "enlarged and unusual meaning" of the
fourth amendment,9 concluded that Congress should enact protective
legislation if it believed that the use of intercepted communications as
evidence in federal criminal trials should be limited.10 In dissent, Jus-
tice Brandeis argued that the Court's interpretation of the fourth
amendment should guard against the increasingly sophisticated means
available to the government to invade privacy and use in court "what is
whispered in the closet.""
In resolving the constitutional issue in favor of a property-oriented
view of fourth amendment rights, rather than one based on a notion of
individual privacy, the Olmstead decision removed electronic surveil-
lance techniques not involving physical intrusions from fourth amend-
ment scrutiny for almost ten years. This left control of such activities
squarely within the discretion of the executive branch.
B. Thermidor and the Deluge
Olmstead set the stage for an enduring conflict between the execu-
tive and legislative branches by allowing executive branch surveillance
involving no actual physical intrusion, yet stirring congressional interest
in regulating the technique and broadening individual protections. The
conflict, which began in the domestic law enforcement context, eventu-
ally spilled over into the national security setting where new considera-
tions complicated and exacerbated the debate.
In 1931, in the face of several unsuccessful congressional proposals
and an executive study of the matter,"2 Attorney General William D.
Mitchell concluded that electronic surveillance, while perhaps raising
ethical issues, was not unlawful. He authorized high-level officials in
charge of "exceptional cases" involving "substantial and serious"
8 Id. at 464-66.
9 Id. at 465-66.
10 Id. at 466.
11 Id. at 474.
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espi-
onage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government ... will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home .... Can it be that the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?
Id.
12 See S. 3344, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931); Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Expenditures in the Exec. Depts.: Wire Tapping and Law Enforcement, 71st Cong.,
3rd Sess., 76 (Testimony of William D. Mitchell) (1931).
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crimes to approve wiretapping.1 3 Meanwhile, growing congressional in-
terest in regulating electronic surveillance led to a 1933 appropriations
bill rider forbidding the use of any authorized funds for wiretapping to
enforce prohibition laws.' 4 The Federal Communications Act of 1934
went even farther and barred interception and disclosure of any wire or
radio communication.15 Interpreting the 1934 Communications Act in
1937, the Supreme Court held in Nardone v. United States"8 that an
electronic interception of a telephone conversation, and disclosure of the
evidence so obtained, was unlawful.1 7 For the next eleven years, this
decision precluded the introduction of evidence obtained by electronic
surveillance. The technique continued to be used, however, because the
Executive construed Nardone as preventing use of electronic surveil-
lance only when it was combined with disclosure of its fruits outside of
the government. In the absence of clear and compelling judicial re-
straint, the executive branch left to Congress the debate concerning
whether and what types of limits should be imposed.1
As the world political situation darkened with the onset of World
War II, the national security aspects of electronic surveillance rose in
importance. In May 1940, the House of Representatives considered and
approved a Joint Resolution affirming the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion's authority to conduct wiretapping for national security purposes.
13 See Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra note 3, at 24 (statement by Attor-
ney General Levi). This early guidance resulted in the later practice, incorporated into
statute, that federal wiretapping for law enforcement purposes be limited to the most
serious crimes such as kidnapping, apprehension of desperate criminals, sabotage, and
espionage.
14 Act of Mar. 1, 1933, Pub. L. No. 387, ch. 144, 47 Stat. 1371, 1381 (1933).
Several proposals to limit federal wiretapping or use of its fruits had been unsuccessful
during the previous year. See H.R. 23, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931); S. 1396, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess.(1931); 74 CONG. REc. 3928 (1931); 75 CONG. REc. 4541 (1932).
'" Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
1064, 1103-04 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. III 1985))
[hereinafter 1934 Communications Act]. The predecessor section can be found in the
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, 1172 (1927).
18 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
' Id. at 382. The Court later extended this holding to bar the use of additional
evidence derived from the intercepted communications. Nardone v. United States, 308
U.S. 338, 340 (1939). But see Justice Department Bans Wiretapping; Jackson Acts on
Hoover Recommendation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1940, § 1, at 1, col. 3 (noting that it
was public knowledge in 1940 that the FBI had engaged in "wire tapping since 1931,
although the practice [had] been held illegal by the Supreme Court").
IS "Whether a criminal or suspected criminal should be completely protected in
his right of privacy, or whether, in the interests of society, an invasion of such right of
privacy should be permitted . . . involves a question of balance, which is peculiarly
within the province of the legislative branch ... ." S. REP. No. 1790, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 4 (1938) (letter of Attorney General Cummings to Sen. Wheeler, dated April 26,
1938).
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The Senate, however, failed to approve the resolution. 9 President
Roosevelt then decided to act unilaterally and expressed his desire to
Attorney General Jackson that "listening devices" be used when "grave
matters involving defense of the nation," such as espionage or subver-
sion, might be involved. Such surveillance was to be limited to aliens
insofar as possible.2 0
The momentum which the executive branch's surveillance activi-
ties had gathered during World War II was not diminished by the ces-
sation of hostilities in 1945. In July 1946, President Truman approved
broader use of electronic surveillance in cases "vitally affecting the do-
mestic security". 21 Eight years later, Attorney General Brownell em-
powered FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct trespassory elec-
tronic surveillance without prior Attorney General approval when the
FBI determined that such intelligence collection was in the national
interest.
22
Meanwhile, during the years following Olmstead, the courts were
moving from a fourth amendment jurisprudence based upon protection
of individual property to one based upon the protection of individual
privacy interests. In a 1942 decision, the Supreme Court refused to
overrule Olmstead and determined that placing a "detectaphone"
against a wall to overhear conversations in an adjoining office was law-
ful because it involved no physical trespass. The forceful tone of Justice
Murphy's dissent, 3 however, and the fact that Justices Stone and
Frankfurter also wished to overrule Olmstead,24 indicated that by a
" H.R.J. Res. 553, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); N. Y. Times, supra note 17, § 1,
at 1, col. 3. See also Hearings on Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and the Bill of Rights,
before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm. pursu-
ant to S. 284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1958).
20 See Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra note 3, at 24 (statement by Attor-
ney General Levi).
21 The President apparently considered rescinding the order when it was deter-
mined later to be more expansive than the Roosevelt order. See S. REP. No. 604, supra
note 3, at 10 n.10.
22 See Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra note 3, at 25 (statement by Attor-
ney General Levi); HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT
TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 7308, H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16
(1978).
2" Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). As Justice Murphy observed:
The search of one's home or office no longer requires physical entry, for
science has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a
person's privacy .... Whether the search of private quarters is accom-
plished by placing on the outer walls of the sanctum a detectaphone that
transmits to the outside listener the intimate details of a private conversa-
tion, or by new methods of photography that penetrate walls or overcome
distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally invaded ...
Id. at 139 (footnotes omitted).
24 Id. at 136.
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slight shift in the Court's thinking, such conversations could be treated
as "effects" and brought within the protection of the fourth
amendment.
Olmstead was further weakened in 1961 by the Court's holding
that the interception of oral communications could violate the fourth
amendment, because a trespass had technically occurred when police
officers used a "spike" microphone that was driven from an adjacent
row house through the wall of a defendant's house and into contact
with a heating duct which served to transmit conversations occurring
throughout the house.25 The Court refused to abandon the requirement
that there be a physical trespass in order to merit fourth amendment
protection, but did not enter into a detailed analysis of property rights,
and indicated a growing recognition of the corrosive effects of new sur-
veillance techniques on privacy interests."
Nonetheless, while the courts and Congress continued to contem-
plate the matter, almost 7000 wiretaps and 2200 microphone surveil-
lances were used by the Executive between 1940 and the mid-1960s in
internal security investigations concerning foreign intelligence agents
and Communist Party leaders, as well as major criminal activities. 27 In
June 1965, President Lyndon Johnson limited the use of wiretaps to
investigations involving the collection of intelligence affecting the na-
tional security and required Attorney General approval for both wire-
taps and microphone surveillance.28 Even under these restrictions, how-
ever, approximately 1,350 warrantless wiretaps and 250 microphone
installations were authorized from 1965 through 1974.29
26 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506-509 (1961).
28 The Court described, but did not find it necessary to deal with, the "frightening
paraphernalia which the vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human
society":
We are favored with a description of "a device known as the parabolic
microphone which can pick up a conversation three hundred yards away."
We are told of a "still experimental technique whereby a room is flooded
with a certain type of sonic wave," which, when perfected, "will make it
possible to overhear everything said in a room without ever entering it or
even going near it." We are informed of an instrument "which can pick
up a conversation through an open office window on the opposite side of a
busy street."
Id. at 508-09.
27 See Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra note 3, at 25 (statement by Attor-
ney General Levi).
28 See id. at 26.
29 Id. at 26.
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C. Property Rights Succumb to Privacy Interests
The activities of the executive branch, abetted by the inadequacy
of congressional supervision of information gathering techniques, pro-
vided the Supreme Court with an impetus to review once again the
fourth amendment limits on electronic surveillance in Katz v. United
States.30 Katz afforded the Court an opportunity to recognize the
threats to privacy interests posed by modern technology - in this case,
an FBI microphone surveillance of a public telephone booth - and to
abandon at last its reliance on the existence of a physical trespass
before invoking the protection of the fourth amendment. The Court, in
a now-famous phrase, ruled that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places"'" and formulated a new test for the validity of any
search, seizure, or surveillance in terms of privacy expectations rather
than property interests.3 2 Fourth amendment protection now focused on
individuals, not locations, and extended to surveillance techniques not
requiring a physical intrusion.
The Court's gratuitous discussion in Katz regarding surveillance
activities undertaken in furtherance of national security interests was
critical to the development of FISA. In a footnote that proved to have
lasting historical significance, the Court expressly preserved national
security surveillance from the reach of its decision that a warrant would
be required for electronic surveillance. 3 Justice White emphasized this
point in a concurring opinion dwelling on the unique requirements of
electronic surveillance for national security purposes. He noted the au-
thorization of such activities by a succession of Presidents, concluding
that no prior judicial review should be required if the President or the
Attorney General found surveillance reasonable under the
circumstances. 4
This distinction between law enforcement and national security re-
quirements for electronic surveillance was subsequently recognized by
Congress as well. In 1968, Congress accepted the judicial and executive
invitation, outstanding since Olmstead, to define more clearly the
proper use of electronic surveillance techniques in criminal investiga-
tions. In enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
30 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead and Goldman).
31 Id. at 351.
2 "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 358 n.23.
34 Id. at 363-64.
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Streets Act, 5 Congress drew upon principles discussed in the Katz de-
cision. The 1968 Omnibus Act established a detailed procedure for the
issuance of a warrant prior to using microphone surveillance or wire-
tapping for law enforcement purposes, based on a finding by a neutral
magistrate of probable cause to believe that a serious crime had been or
was about to be committed. 6
The statute specifically disclaimed any intention that its provi-
sions, or those of the 1934 Communications Act, should be read to af-
fect the constitutional powers of the President to protect the United
States against hostile foreign powers, to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation, to protect the government against efforts to overthrow it by
force, or to guard against any other "clear and present danger."37 Fur-
ther, information collected under these circumstances could be received
in evidence in any proceeding, so long as the surveillance was deter-
mined to be "reasonable."38 ' This provision could be, and indeed was,
fairly understood by the executive branch as tacit congressional accept-
ance of the claimed inherent power of the President to authorize these
activities under the circumstances described so vaguely in the statute.3 9
D. The Greening of Inherent Authority
Congress, like the Supreme Court, was not prepared in 1968 to
regulate the Executive's claim of inherent power to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance for national security purposes. This deference,
like prior congressional inaction, perpetuated the ability of the execu-
tive branch to occupy the field and conduct electronic surveillance with-
out prior judicial review when deemed necessary." Given the turbulent
" Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520 (1968)) [hereinafter 1968 Omnibus Act].
-6 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a), (b) (1968).
37 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968).
I d.
3 See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 653 n.191 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (quoting a worried senator during floor debate on § 2511
(3): "As I read it - and this is my fear - we are saying that the President ... could
[unilaterally] declare . . . draft dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil
rights activists to be a clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the
Government.").
40 The executive branch rationale for not obtaining prior judicial approval of such
activities included assertions that the judiciary was not competent to assess the validity
of intelligence-related surveillance; that the courts did not operate under the security
measures necessary to protect the sensitive information involved; that the absence of a
criminal investigation (in a strict sense) reduced the need for such review; that the
courts could not move rapidly enough to cope with urgent developments; and that judi-
cial review would pose a debilitating burden on the Executive's vital freedom to act in
these matters. See id. at 641.
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upheavals of the 1960s, it became almost inevitable that the Court and
Congress would have to clarify once more the extent to which the Exec-
utive's claims of inherent power were to be recognized.
These limits were discussed to some extent in the lower courts."'
The seminal case in the development of the law of national security
surveillance, however, proved to be the so-called "Keith" case, United
States v. United States District Court, decided by the Supreme Court
in 1972.42 Among the defendants in Keith, who were alleged to have
conspired to destroy government property, was one who had been
charged with bombing a CIA office in Michigan.4" Pretrial proceedings
revealed that this defendant's conversations had been overheard by the
government in the course of a warrantless electronic surveillance au-
thorized by the Attorney General in order to acquire intelligence neces-
sary to protect against attacks and subversion by domestic
organizations.
44
The Court concluded that the reservation of presidential authority
in the 1968 Omnibus Act 45 represented merely a neutral statement by
Congress that the President has some degree of power in the areas of
national defense and internal security and was not an attempt to "ex-
pand," "contract," or "define" that power.46 Thus, it was necessary to
examine the constitutional, rather than the statutory, basis for the sur-
veillance authority asserted on the President's behalf.
47
The Court was careful to point out that the case before it con-
cerned only surveillance of domestic organizations - those having no
significant connections to foreign powers or their agents - deemed to
threaten the existence of the government.48 Moreover, the Court was
quick to concede that the President has a fundamental duty to protect
,against unlawful subversion and that a government's basic function is
to defend itself and its citizens."9 The Court was well aware, however,
that the difficulty of defining the inherently ambiguous power to pro-
tect "domestic security" is compounded in cases involving national se-
41 See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 506-08 (D.D.C. 1971)
(rejecting the government's argument that foreign intelligence and domestic affairs are
"inextricably intertwined," and holding four of five warrantless surveillances unlawful
because they were intended to collect evidence against dissident domestic organizations,
not foreign intelligence).
42 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
43 Id. at 299.
44 Id. at 300.
41 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
4' Keith, 407 U.S. at 303-08 ("In short, Congress simply left presidential powers
where it found them.").
47 Id. at 308.
48 Id. at 308, 309 & n.8.
49 Id. at 310.
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curity surveillance because first amendment concerns of stifling debate
and discussion, as well as fourth amendment values, are necessarily
implicated.50
The Court balanced the danger to individual privacy against the
potential for frustrating governmental objectives and held that the
fourth amendment required prior judicial review of any electronic sur-
veillance for domestic security purposes.51 Although the Court rejected
the government's arguments that courts lacked the necessary expertise
and security to evaluate this type of intelligence activity, it emphasized
that its holding did not extend to surveillance involving foreign powers
or their agents.52
Furthermore, the Court urged Congress to enact legislation that
would supplement the 1968 Omnibus Act and strike a constitutionally
permissible balance between criminal and domestic security surveillance
so as to create a more workable framework for judicial review.5" Be-
cause domestic security surveillance implicates different policies and is
for different purposes than those contemplated by the "ordinary crime"
standards of the 1968 Omnibus Act, different application, duration, and
reporting requirements might be appropriate, and a specially designed
court might be useful for sensitive cases."
No congressional action has ever been taken regarding the use of
electronic surveillance in the domestic security area. Nonetheless, the
Court's explanation in Keith regarding the flexibility that would be
permissible under the fourth amendment paved the way for FISA and
its carefully tailored provisions for surveillance of foreign powers and
their agents in the United States.
E. From Keith to FISA
The Supreme Court in Keith had not addressed the legality of
warrantless electronic surveillance undertaken by the Executive for
genuine national security purposes. Lower federal courts, however, con-
tinued to grapple with this issue and their opinions also made impor-
tant contributions to the shaping of FISA. Of the five federal courts of
appeals that examined warrantless electronic surveillance activities,
50 Id. at 314 ("[Plrivate dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to
our free society").
51 Id. at 313-15, 319, 321 (citing United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 425-
26 (D.C. Cal. 1971) for the proposition that warrantless surveillance of situations in-
volving foreign powers may be constitutional).
52 Id. at 321, 322 & n.20.
53 Id. at 322-24.
5 Id. at 322.
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four readily accepted the existence of a foreign intelligence exception to
the warrant requirement based on the legal and policy arguments put
forward by the Executive.
Typically, these arguments reflected a concern for the efficiency
and expertise of the nation's foreign intelligence process and the delete-
rious effects that might result from judicial interference. For instance,
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Brown5" upheld the legality of an
Attorney General-authorized warrantless surveillance that was targeted
at the object of a genuine foreign intelligence investigation and inciden-
tally acquired the communications of a black activist, H. Rap. Brown.56
Similarly, the Third Circuit held in United States v. Butenko5" that
warrantless surveillance whose "primary purpose" was to obtain for-
eign intelligence information concerning the activities of foreign powers
within the United States was lawful even when conversations of Ameri-
can citizens were acquired.5" The court noted that the strong public
interest in the efficient operation of the nation's intelligence process
could be frustrated if officials were required to interrupt their opera-
tions to "rush to the nearest available magistrate.
59
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Buck"0 also held that elec-
tronic surveillance of foreign powers and their agents was considered a
"recognized exception" to the general warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment. 61  The Fourth Circuit, in United States v.
Truong,62 wrestled with the difficult issue of when an investigation be-
comes a search for evidence of a crime rather than an intelligence gath-
ering effort, but clearly recognized a warrant exception flowing from
the Executive's presumed expertise in the foreign intelligence area. The
court would not accept the defendant's assertions that the activity must
be "solely" related to national security issues, nor the government's
claim that "any" degree of foreign intelligence interest would suffice.63
Thus, only information acquired after the date at which the court de-
termined the investigation had become primarily criminal in nature
55 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). This circuit
had held prior to Keith that a foreign intelligence surveillance authorized by the Attor-
ney General did not violate the fourth amendment. United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165
(5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
5' Brown, 484 F.2d at 425-26.
5 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
58 Id. at 606.
59 Id. at 605.
60 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977).
61 Id. at 875-76.
62 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
63 Id. at 912-16.
[Vol. 137:793
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
was suppressed as the fruit of unlawful warrantless surveillance. 4
The only-federal court to cast fundamental doubt upon the consti-
tutional basis for this type of warrantless surveillance was the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in the 1975 decision, Zweibon v.
Mitchell.65 The case involved individual damages claims relating to
warrantless FBI electronic surveillance of Jewish Defense League
members suspected of violent activities against Soviet facilities in the
United States. 6 The court recited the conclusion from Keith that a
warrant is required for electronic surveillance of a domestic organiza-
tion that is neither a foreign power nor an agent of, or collaborator
with, such a power, regardless of whether the group's activities might
have some impact on U.S. foreign relations.6 7
Yet a plurality of the court went further and expressed its belief
that "absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic surveil-
lance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional."68 While the case
did not involve surveillance of foreign powers or their agents, the depth
and force of this bold insinuation that no national security exception
should exist provided the executive branch and Congress with a sub-
stantial basis for reconsidering the state of the law in this area. The
plurality opinion also provided a point-by-point rebuttal of the entire
array of arguments the executive branch had relied upon for years to
establish the legality and reasonableness of warrantless surveillance.69
In concluding its discussion, the Zweibon court underscored the
potential for flexibility as to the scope, standards, and approval periods
that could be constitutionally applied by a court engaged in a prior
review.70 This portion of the opinion anticipated many of the key ele-
ments addressed in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
64 Id. at 916. The court noted that FISA had been enacted while the case was
pending and that such activities would be subject to prior judicial review in the future.
Id. at 914 n.4.
65 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
66 Id. at 600.
67 Id. at 614.
6 Id. at 614, (emphasis added). For a more detailed discussion of the sweeping
statement, see id. at 655-58.
69 Id. at 615-27, 633-51.
70 Id. at 667-70.
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III. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT Is BORN
A. Development of FISA
1. The Congressional Challenge to Executive Pre-eminence
By the mid-1970s, the law concerning national security-related
electronic surveillance remained obscure, ambiguous and inconclusive
despite almost fifty years of intermittent judicial and congressional at-
tention and the practice of nine presidential administrations. The ma-
jority of the courts that had examined the legality of these matters
seemed to focus as much or more on the purpose of the surveillance as
on the underlying authority and nature of the subject. In Keith, the
Supreme Court had invited Congress to develop standards for national
security-related electronic surveillance that differed from those required
for law enforcement surveillance in the 1968 Omnibus Act. These stan-
dards, according to the Court, could include less precise findings of
probable cause and even a specially designed court to authorize sensi-
tive activities."
In an effort to ensure that its surveillance activities would be
found reasonable if examined subsequently, the Executive unilaterally
adopted warrantless electronic surveillance standards and procedures
without specific congressional or judicial guidance. Such surveillance
was to be limited to cases where the targets were foreign powers or
their agents and where the purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence or
counter-intelligence information. In addition, the scope of the intrusion
and the use to which its fruits could be put would be carefully
limited. 2
The congressional mood at this time was one of antagonism to-
ward the Executive because of Watergate and the disclosures in 1975
and 1976 of a broad range of perceived abuses of authority, especially
in the area of intelligence and national security-related activities. The
inquiries of the "Church Committee" into the activities of the intelli-
gence agencies of the United States had uncovered far-ranging infringe-
ments upon individual privacy interests through the unfettered use of
electronic surveillance and other intelligence collection techniques."3 Of
71 407 U.S. at 322-23.
7 See Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra note 3, at 77 (statement by Attor-
ney General Levi).
" See FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMEN-
TAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE AC-
TIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 19, 139, 151-53, 169-70, 183-92, 198-202, 290 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH
COMMITTEE REPORT].
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particular concern were instances where warrantless electronic surveil-
lance had been used against United States citizens who were not readily
identifiable as reasonable sources of foreign intelligence information,
who appeared to pose little threat to the national security, and who
were not alleged to be involved in any criminal activity.7 4 The Church
Committee reported that the abuses of executive discretion resulted
from the absence of clear congressional or judicial standards and the
unsettled state of the law in this area. 5
The Church Committee's final recommendations included a gen-
eral disclaimer of any inherent authority on the part of the President or
the intelligence agencies to "violate the law" by engaging in, among
other things, warrantless electronic surveillance .7  The Committee rec-
ommendations further urged a statutory framework restricting elec-
tronic surveillance for intelligence purposes within the United States to
that conducted by the FBI pursuant to a judicial warrant. 7 The report
also included recommendations that use of these techniques against
Americans abroad also be permitted only pursuant to a judicial
warrant.y
By 1978, the recommendations embodied in the Church Commit-
tee report appeared to have persuaded many in Congress of the need to
regulate electronic surveillance for national security purposes.7 In par-
74 See id. at 5.
75
Congress and the Supreme Court have both addressed the legal issues
raised by electronic surveillance, but the law has been riddled with gaps
and exceptions. The Executive branch has been able to apply vague stan-
dards for the use of this technique to particular cases as it has seen fit,
and, in the case of [National Security Agency] monitoring, the standards
and procedures for the use of electronic surveillance were not applied at
all.
Id. at 186-87.
76 Id. at 297.
17 See id. at 299, 302; see also id. at 325, 327-28 (urging that surveillance be
conducted only pursuant to a judicial warrant).
78 Id. at 305-06, 308-09.
7 The difficulties obstructing the judicial construction of a reasonable framework
for national security activities were aptly described by the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence:
[Tihe development of the law regulating electronic surveillance for na-
tional security purposes has been uneven and inconclusive. This is to be
expected where the development is left to the judicial branch in an area
where cases do not regularly come before it. [T]he development of stan-
dards and restrictions by the judiciary ... [threatens both civil liberties
and national security, because it] occurs generally in ignorance of the fact,
circumstances and techniques of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance
not present in the particular case before the court.
. . . the tiny window to this area which a particular case affords
provides inadequate light by which judges may be relied upon to develop
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ticular, Congress was urged to act and adopt a legislative framework
that would remove electronic surveillance for national security purposes
from the sole discretion of the Executive."0
Among the earliest and most serious issues confronting Congress
was the threshold question of whether it was permissible to involve fed-
eral judges in approving requests for electronic surveillance conducted
for national security purposes. These fears were alleviated by a legal
analysis completed at the request of Congress which concluded that
"there is every reason to believe that Congress may constitutionally
confer such authority."8' The conclusion was based on three indepen-
dent premises: that a surveillance approval constitutes a case or contro-
versy arising under Article III of the Constitution; that similar other
functions such as naturalization and bankruptcy proceedings had been
previously imposed upon the courts; and that judicial supervision of
governmental intrusions into individual privacy was consistent with the
drafters' intent in delineating judicial power in Article III of the
Constitution."2
2. Cooperation and Compromise
Proponents of national security electronic surveillance legislation
received their greatest encouragement from Attorneys General William
Saxbe and Edward Levi. These officials agreed to work with the Senate
to establish judicial regulation of such surveillance that would respect
civil liberties yet facilitate the acquisition of necessary intelligence
information."3
case law which adequately balances the rights of privacy and national
security.
H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 21-22 (1978).
80 See id.
81 See Constitutional Validity of a Statutory Provision Vesting Authority in the
United Statqs District Courts to Consider and Issue Orders Approving the Intercep-
tion of Wire andlor Oral Communications for the Purposes of Gathering Foreign
Intelligence Information: Presence of a Case or Controversy, Congressional Research
Service, American Law Division, 1 (1975).
82 Id. While the Supreme Court invalidated the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) for
violating separation of powers principles, the formalistic conception of Justice Bren-
nan's plurality opinion regarding Article III did not affect the analysis in the above
report. Furthermore, the Court has moved away from the Brennan approach towards a
functional analysis in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S.
568 (1985) and in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245
(1986). The initial analysis permitting Article III judges to be involved with surveil-
lance procedures remains valid.
83 See Hearings on S. 743, S. 1888, S. 3197 before Senate Judiciary Comm.
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 71 (March 29-30,
1976).
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Another sizable step forward occurred when, on March 23, 1976,
President Ford transmitted a bill to the Senate along with a letter urg-
ing its enactment.84 The transmittal letter explained that the proposal
would enable the Government to collect necessary foreign intelligence
but assured the public that national security electronic surveillance
would occur only in circumstances demonstrating an overriding na-
tional interest, and would conform to standards and procedures that
"cprotect against abuse."8 This bill drew upon the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Keith that Congress could provide specialized warrants
consistent with the varying governmental and private interests affected.
It included a warrant standard permitting the interception of wire or
oral communications upon a finding of probable cause that the "target"
was an agent of a foreign power and was engaged in clandestine intelli-
gence activities, sabotage, or terrorism at the direction of that power.86
President Ford's proposal also preserved the constitutional power
of the President to authorize surveillance in circumstances that would
not be covered by the bill and where such surveillance was deemed
necessary for the national defense purposes that had been described in
the 1968 Omnibus Act.
8
7
For the next two years, substantial discussion centered upon the
question of reserved presidential authority and the issue of whether a
"criminal standard," i.e., an additional requirement that no American
be a target unless that individual's activities can be shown to constitute
a violation of United States criminal law, should be included in the bill.
The proponents of this requirement argued that electronic surveillance
should be limited to cases involving violations of criminal law88 since it
See Hearings on S. 743, S. 1888, S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1976)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy reading prepared statement of Sen. Nelson) [hereinafter
Criminal Hearings].
8 See Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Trans-
mitting Proposed Legislation on the Use of Electronic Surveillance To Obtain Foreign
Intelligence Information (March 23, 1976), 1 PuB. PAPERS 793 (1979) (papers of Ger-
ald R. Ford).
88 See id. at 794.
87 Hearings on s. 743, S. 1888, S. 3197 before Senate Judiciary Comm. Sub-
comm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures, supra note 85, at 124 (citing § 2511(3)).
See Hearings on the FISA of 1977, H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308 and
H.R. 5632, Before the House Perm. Select Comm. on Intelligence Subcomm. on Legis-
lation on the FISA of 1977, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978) [hereinafter House Hear-
ings on the FISA of 1977] (testimony of John Shattuck, Executive Director, Washing-
ton Office of the ACLU) ("if the wiretap standard is too low . . .Congress could end
up. . .authorizing, rather than curtailing, intelligence agency abuses."); see also id. at
9-11 (prepared statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell), 80-82 (prepared state-
ments of John Shattuck and Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel to the ACLU), 101-
102 (testimony of Louis H. Pollack, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law
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is generally intrusive and inherently results in the acquisition of many
irrelevant communications.
These two elements, the standard for targeting Americans and the
status of the President's inherent authority, formed-the core of subse-
quent legislative deliberations.8" Other persistent but less contentious
issues included, in addition to whether authorizing such activities was a
proper role for the federal courts, the treatment afforded aliens in the
United States and whether the bill should be extended to warrantless
surveillance of Americans overseas.
Hearings on the Ford proposal continued through 1976. At the
same time, Senator Kennedy introduced a bill that built upon the prior
year's legislation, but differed in several meaningful respects from the
Ford bill. It specifically repealed the provision in the 1968 Omnibus
Act addressing constitutional Presidential authority and was intended to
eliminate, or at least limit, inherent presidential authority in this area.
The Kennedy bill also required a warrant for the interception of inter-
national communications to or from targeted Americans in the United
States.90 The provisions that allowed targeting of Americans who had
committed no violation of federal criminal law remained the most seri-
ous issue in the hearings that followed. 1
The Carter Administration supported such legislation in principle
and continued to work with Congress to develop an acceptable propo-
sal.92 The bills with the greatest support required a judicial warrant
prior to surveillance. At the same time, there continued to be sentiment
for a system, such as that proposed by Congressman McClory, that
would create statutory, non-judicial authority for an executive branch
approval procedure.9" Such a system was based upon the assertion that
judicial involvement in the foreign intelligence area was inappropriate,
School), 195 (prepared statement of Rep. Robert F. Drinan).
89 See generally, Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976).
90 See House Hearings on the FISA of 1977, supra note 90, at 8-9; Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on
Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1977-78) [hereinafter Senate Intelligence Committee hearings
on the FISA of 1978] (prepared statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell); Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
14 (1977) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings on the FISA of 1977] (state-
ment of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
91 See Criminal Hearings, supra note 86, at 12.
92 See House Hearings on the FISA of 1977, supra note 90, at 12 (prepared
statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
" See id. at 275; id. at 219-22 (testimony of the Hon. Laurence Silberman).
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and would have required certification by the President, Attorney Gen-
eral, and the National Security Advisor to the President, or other senior
officials. The certification would ensure that the target of the surveil-
lance was an agent of a foreign power and that the other elements re-
quired by the bill were present.94
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence examined
the alternatives and, after extensive hearings, recommended that the
House enact the House version of the Kennedy bill.95 The Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence had earlier reported favorably on the
Senate version.96 By this time, both bills had been modified to include a
'quasi-criminal" targeting standard, i.e., Americans could be the
targets of national security electronic surveillance only if their conduct,
in addition to being of foreign intelligence interest, held the potential
for violating a criminal law of the United States. 7 Further, the Justice
Department had analyzed the law and found a substantial basis for
providing different standards for targeting aliens representing foreign
governments in the United States. 8 This conclusion was based upon
the premise that, to the extent these persons enjoy diplomatic immunity
and are not generally subject to the strictures of our laws, they do not
enjoy the same levels of protection under our laws, specifically the
Fourth Amendment.99
After the Senate and House Conference, Congress passed the re-
sulting bill, and it was signed into law by President Carter in October
1978.00
B. The Fruit of Interbranch Cooperation: FISA
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is intended to provide
the exclusive means of authorizing various types of electronic surveil-
lance activities for national security purposes, including:
(1) deliberate interception of the contents of international radio or
wire communications to or from a particular United States person in
the United States in circumstances where that person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the intercep-
tion were undertaken for law enforcement purposes;
" See H.R. REP. No. 1283, IT. 1, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4-5 (1978).
95 See id. at 2.
96 See generally, S. REP'. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
9 See House Hearings on the FISA of 1977, supra note 90, at 195; H.R. REP.
No. 1283, supra note 22, at 3, 62.
98 See House Hearings on the FISA of 1977, supra note 90, at 23.
9 See id. at 25.
.00 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 - Statement on Signing S.
1-566 Into Law, 2 PUBLIC PAPERS 1853 (Oct. 25, 1978) (papers of James E. Carter).
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(2) deliberate interception of the contents of a wholly domestic ra-
dio communication, and the installation or use of any monitoring device
(such as a television camera or pen register) to acquire information
about a person's activities other than the contents of communications,
when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would
be required if the interception or monitoring were undertaken for law
enforcement purposes;
(3) interception in the United States of the contents of a wire com-
munication to or from any person in the United States without the con-
sent of a party to the communication.1"1
Such activities must be authorized in advance by one of seven fed-
eral district court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court as members of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) and at least one of whom is a member of a federal district court
in the Washington, D.C. area.102 The government presents applications
for warrants to the FISC judges in in camera, ex parte proceedings
conducted under physical security measures designed to protect sensitive
national security information." 3 The Chief Justice also designates
three federal appeals court judges to review government appeals in in-
stances in which FISC judges have denied applications for warrants.0 4
All applications to the FISC require advance approval from the
Attorney General.' 0 5 A FISC judge may approve applications upon a
finding that the target is a foreign power (i.e., foreign government, fac-
tion, terrorist or political group, or organization controlled by a foreign
government), or an agent of a foreign power (i.e., a non-resident alien
who is an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign power, and United
States persons whose activities on behalf of foreign powers may involve
criminal acts relating to intelligence or terrorist operations).' 06 The
term "United States person" is used to identify persons and entities that
are entitled to greater protection under the Act and includes any United
States citizen, permanent resident alien, groups composed largely of
such persons, and United States corporations.'
0 7
The FISC judge must find the location at which the surveillance is
directed will be used by the targeted foreign power or agent, and that
procedures proposed by the government in each case will adequately
101 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (1982 & Supp.
1984).
102 Id. at § 1803 (a).
103 Id. at §§ 1804(a),1805(a), 1803(c).
104 See id. at § 1803(b).
105 Id. at §§ 1804(a), 1805(a)(3).
106 Id. at §§ 1801(a), (b), 1805(a)(3).
107 Id. at § 1801(i).
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minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information
concerning unconsenting United States persons, while preserving the
government's ability to obtain the intelligence it seeks.108 Applications
to the FISC must be accompanied by certifications from senior govern-
ment officials that the information sought "relates to" or, if it concerns
a United States person, "is necessary to" United States national defense
or foreign affairs, or the ability to the United States to protect against
grave hostile acts, terrorism, sabotage, or clandestine intelligence activi-
ties of a foreign power. 109 If the FISC judge is satisfied that the rele-
vant standards of the Act have been met, electronic surveillance may be
approved for up to ninety days or a year, depending upon the nature of
the target.1 10 Renewal applications are subject to the same standards."'
Although the Attorney General must approve and make certain
findings, there is no requirement of a FISC order when surveillance is
directed solely at communications among or between foreign powers or
is targeted at property under the "open and exclusive" control of a for-
eign power, where the circumstances indicate it is highly unlikely that
communications of a United States person will be acquired. 1 2 The only
other exceptions from the requirement for a FISC order are emergen-
cies, where the Attorney General may approve warrantless surveillance
for up to twenty-four hours while FISC approval is pursued, and spec-
ified types of testing, training, and communications security
activities.113
The Act also contains detailed provisions specifying the require-
ments and procedures mandated when information obtained from sur-
veillance activities is intended to be used in criminal or other proceed-
ings.1" Barring such situations or an emergency surveillance approval
by the Attorney General that is subsequently rejected by the FISC,
however, there is no requirement to give notice to any target concerning
the fact that the government has conducted such surveillance.11 5
108 Id. at §§ 1804(a)(4)(B), (5), 1801(h).
109 Id. §§ 1804(a)(7), 1801(e)(2). Six hypothetical situations supplied by Attor-
ney General Griffin Bell during congressional proceedings illustrate the potential diffi-
culties in determining whether warrants for electronic surveillance should be pursued
under the 1968 Omnibus Act or FISA. See Judiciary Comm. Hearings on the FISA of
1977, supra note 90, at 8-10 (letter to Senator Abourezk from Attorney General Grif-
fin Bell dated June 28, 1977). See also Senate Intelligence Committee Hearings on the
FISA of 1978, supra note 92, at 119-21 (containing the six hypothetical cases submit-
ted by Attorney General Griffin Bell).
110 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d).
"I Id.
112 Id. at 99 1802(a)(1)(A), (B).
11s Id. at §§ 1805(e), (f).
11 Id. at § 1806.
115 Id. at § 18060).
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IV. FISA IMPLEMENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
The Act requires semi-annual reports from the Attorney General
to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and those committees
were required to report to their respective houses of Congress annually
concerning the implementation of the Act during its first five years.11
The Attorney General's reports 17 indicate that the FISC has reviewed
in the following number of applications and that no government re-
quest for electronic surveillance has been denied by the court during its
first ten years of existence:
Applications Orders"..
May 1979"1 - December 1979 199 207
January 1980 - December 1980 319 322
January 1981 - December 1981 431 433
January 1982 - December 1982 473 475
January 1983 - December 1983 549 549
116 Id. at §§ 1808(a), (b).
1 See generally SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 379, 96th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter SSCI FISA REP.]; S. REP. No. 1017, 96th Cong.
2d Sess. (1980); S. REP. No. 280, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. REP. No. 691, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. REP. No. 660, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); HOUSE PERMA-
NENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN INTEL-
LIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, H. R. Rep. No. 558, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [here-
inafter HPSCI FISA REP.]; H.R. REP. No. 1466, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H. R.
REP. No. 318, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. REP. No. 974, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); H. R. REP. No. 738, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). In addition, see the follow-
ing letters on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review; letter from Attor-
ney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
(April 20, 1980); letter from Attorney General William French Smith to the Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives (April 22, 1981); letter from Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith to William E. Foley, Director, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (April 15, 1982); letter from Edward C. Schmults, Acting Attorney Gen-
eral to William E. Foley, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(April 4, 1983); letter from Attorney General William French Smith to William E.
Foley, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (March 6, 1984);
letters from Attorney General Edwin Meese III to William E. Foley, Director, Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts (March 6, 1985, March 5, 1986, March 24,
1987, March 30, 1988). The reports and letters verify that no government request for
electronic surveillance has been denied by the court.
"18 The number of orders may exceed the number of applications because surveil-
lance of more than one location or use of more than one surveillance technique may be
requested in a single order. See H.R. REP. No. 738, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4 n.5 (1984).
11 The legislation was enacted with the expectation of a delay between its enact-
ment and implementation. It states that the act was effective immediately except that
"electronic surveillance approved by the Attorney General . . . shall not be deemed
unlawful for failure to follow the procedures of this Act, if that surveillance is termi-
nated or an order approving [it]. . . is obtained. . . within 90 days following designa-
tion of the first judge." See Pub. L. 95-511, supra note 1, at Title III.
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January 1984 - December 1984 635 635
January 1985 - December 1985 573 573
January 1986 - December 1986 587 587
January 1987 - December 1987 512 512120
Totals 4278 4293
Thus, in over four thousand matters involving electronic surveillance
using various techniques directed at various types of targets in various
circumstances, the FISC saw fit to deny no government request.' 2' As
is explained in more detail in the next section of this commentary, the
only instance in which the FISC has denied a government application
occurred when, at the government's own urging, the FISO reversed it-
self and determined that it had no jurisdiction to authorize physical
searches for intelligence purposes.
Proponents of FISA argue that the lack of a denial demonstrates
the careful consideration and judgment exercised by the executive
branch in reviewing and preparing applications for submission to the
FISO, and that only cases that satisfactorily meet the statutory stan-
dards are brought before the Court. 22 Opponents argue that the se-
crecy that surrounds the FISO prevents a determination of whether
these figures indicate instead that the FISC has become a captive of the
national security establishment and serves only to encourage executive
officials, now protected by judicial approval, to conduct activities that
would otherwise never have been proposed.'
120 The decrease in annual totals does not necessarily indicate a decrease in the
use of FISA but may be traced to a number of factors such as consolidation of surveil-
lance requests regarding similar targets, a reduction in the number of available targets,
changes in government priorities, a lack of adequate resources, or even technical imple-
menting difficulties.
121 There appears to have been at least one instance in which a FISO judge modi-
fied a government request, authorizing the government to conduct a type of activity that
had not been requested. See S. REP. 660, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984). See also
Schwartz, Oversight of Minimization Compliance Under the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act: How the Watchdogs Are Doing Their Jobs, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 405, 441
n.212 (1981).
122 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) (testimony of Mary C. Lawton,
Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Department of Justice, stating, "[t]o date, the court has
not rejected a single application. We are proud of that record."). The chairman of the
subcommittee went so far as to suggest that a flawed application could be submitted
merely to obtain a FISC denial and dispel the court's "rubber stamp" image. Id.
12 Id. at 27 (testimony of Mark Lynch, Attorney, ACLU). These fears should be
alleviated somewhat by the fact that all the district and circuit courts that have con-
ducted independent reviews of FISC authorizations have determined them to have been
lawful. See id. at 6-7 (testimony of Mary C. Lawton); see also infra notes 127-53 and
accompanying text.
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The constitutional issues that were debated during consideration of
the various bills that preceded the enactment of FISA have persisted.
These issues include whether the Congress has the power to limit or
regulate executive authority that was long thought to be inherent and
constitutionally based. Another area of dispute concerns the extent to
which the fourth amendment requires procedures patterned on those
embodied in the 1968 Omnibus Act rather than those adopted in FISA
which, among other differences, allows some forms of warrantless sur-
veillance and requires no notice to the targets. There continues to be
concern over whether surveillance should be authorized, particularly
against a United States person, when there is no finding of probable
cause to believe a crime is being, has been, or is about to be (as opposed
to the FISA standard of "may be,") committed and that evidence of
criminal activity will be obtained. Also, the distinctions and differing
levels of protection afforded aliens, as opposed to United States persons,
in the United States have continued to be debated.""
Additional questions continue to revolve around the government's
authority under the statute to exclude a criminal defendant and obtain
an ex parte, in camera hearing on any motion to suppress information
acquired under FISA. Further, the entire FISA framework has been
challenged as overly broad, far too generalized, and unreasonable in the
burdens it imposes on individual privacy interests in favor of the gov-
ernment and in the name of national security. Finally, the nature of the
judiciary is subject to challenge on the grounds that federal judges lack
the jurisdiction to perform the function FISA gives them and that they
lack the competence to intrude into the President's foreign policy
domain. 2 '
These questions - the faithfulness of FISA implementation by
the Executive and the FISC, as well as the constitutional validity of the
statutory framework itself - have undergone repeated scrutiny by the
federal courts, generally in the context of terrorism and espionage pros-
124 See, e.g., Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judi-
cial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1116, 1135-50 (1980)
(discussing the separation of powers issues that FISA raises); Note, The Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719, 747-59 (1980)
(discussing whether the legislative branch is overstepping its boundaries by enacting
FISA and whether FISA violates the fourth amendment); see also infra notes 127-134
and accompanying text; Jachnycky & Kornblum, America's Secret Court: Listening in
on Espionage and Terrorism, 24 JUDGES' J., 15, 17 (1985) (discussing cases that have
upheld the constitutionality of FISA against challenges that the FISA court was not
created in accordance with Article II of the Constitution, and that FISA violates the
due process clause of the fifth amendment).
12' See Jachnycky & Kornblum, supra note 124, at 16.
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ecutions, during the ten years since FISA became law. 2 ' The legal
arguments that have been made in these cases in opposition to surveil-
lance activities authorized under FISA have fallen into the same gen-
eral categories - the basic constitutionality under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of FISA's targeting and procedural standards, the nature
and competency of the FISA Court, and basic compliance with the re-
quirements of the statute in terms of the actual purpose of the surveil-
lance and the sufficiency of the minimization procedures that are uti-
lized to protect the privacy interests of communicants. These
arguments, and the judicial response to them, are best illustrated by
reviewing the opinion in United States v. Duggan.
127
In Duggan, the defendants had been convicted of violating various
firearms and munitions statutes on behalf of the Provisional Irish Re-
publican Army. At trial, motions to suppress evidence obtained through
a FISA surveillance were denied.' 28 The trial court had satisfied itself
as to the propriety of the surveillance on an ex parte, in camera basis
following the filing of an Affidavit and Claim of Privilege by Acting
Attorney General Edward Schmults.'29 On appeal, the defendants as-
serted a broad range of attacks on FISA.
At the constitutional level, they contended that the statutory stan-
128 The following cases have involved public review of FISA surveillance since
FISA was enacted: United States v. Posey, No. 87-5297, slip op. (9th Cir. Jan. 9,
1989); In Re: Grand Jury v. (Under Seal), No. 88-5610 (4th Cir. filed Sept. 14, 1988);
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1741
(1988); United States v. Badia, 827 F. 2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1115 (1988); United States v. Ott, 827 F. 2d 473 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Duggan, 743 F. 2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.
2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Psinakis, CR-86-1064-RHS (N.D. Cal.
1988) (upheld without opinion): United States v. Hawamda, Crim. No. 88-168-A
(E.D. Va. filed Sept. 25, 1988); United States v. Davies, 86-1003-SAW (N.D. Cal.
1989) (upheld without opinion): United States v. Chin, Crim. No. 85-263-A (E.D. Va.
filed Jan. 29, 1986); United States v. Ogorodnikova (C.D. Cal. 1985) (upheld without
an opinion); United States v. Miller, CR No. 84-972(A) -KN (C.D. Cal. 1985) (pend-
ing at 9th Cir.); United States v. Harper, CR 83-0770-SC (N.D. Cal. 1984); United
States v. Zehe, No. 83-296-N (D. Mass. filed Feb. 15, 1984); United States v. Horton,
(E.D. Va. 1983) (upheld without opinion); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Zacharski, No. CR 81-679-Kn (C.D. Cal. filed
Sept. 23, 1981); United States v. Hovsepian, No. CR 82-917-MRP (C.D. Cal. filed
Jan. 25, 1985), affd sub nom. United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F. 2d 959 (9th Cir.
1988). In three other cases, FISA issues were involved but the defendants were ex-
changed for individuals held behind the Iron Curtain before the issues were decided.
See United States v. Kostadinov, 83-CR-616 VLB (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v.
Koecher, 84-CR-1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Michelson, CR 84-00578
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
217 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
128 Id. at 64-65.
12 Id. at 67; see also United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1196-97
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
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dard for targeting individuals under FISA did not satisfy fourth
amendment probable cause requirements and deprived individuals of
due process and equal protection."' The Second Circuit concluded that
the FISA concepts of national defense, national security, and foreign
affairs were not overly vague and that the portions of FISA that related
to these defendants were "plainly applicable . . . explicit, unequivocal,
and clearly defined."' 81 As for the claim that collecting foreign intelli-
gence under FISA is unconstitutional because the fourth amendment
requires there to be probable cause to believe a crime has been commit-
ted in all cases of government surveillance, the court retraced the his-
tory of judicial recognition of the substantially different interests in-
volved in national security and criminal investigations. 2 After
discussing the purposes of FISA, it concluded that the statutory proce-
dures created a "constitutionally adequate balancing of the individual's
Fourth Amendment rights against the nation's need to obtain intelli-
gence information."1""
Similarly, the appeals court did not believe that the differentiation
between aliens and United States persons that is embodied in FISA
violated equal protection principles. 3 ' Rather, this framework was
viewed as an appropriate exercise of political judgment by the Congress
and was rationally related to the purpose of protecting the United
States against actions of foreign powers135
The nature and competency of the FISC was challenged by alleg-
ing that vesting authority in judicial officers to determine "a political
question," that is, whether a surveillance is necessary to acquire foreign
intelligence relevant to the conduct of United States foreign affairs and
combatting terrorism, is a violation of separation of powers princi-
ples. 1 36 The court responded that the determination was a traditional
factual, not political, process and that the limited role of the FISC
judges in ensuring that an executive branch certification that the sur-
veillance is necessary is not "clearly erroneous" did not unduly involve
the courts in foreign policy matters.1 37 The district court had also re-
jected the argument that the establishment of the FISC violated the
130 Duggan, 743 F.2d at 64-65.
131 Id. at 71.
132 Id. at 72-74.
133 Id. at 73.
134 Id. at 75.
135 Id. at 75-76. Additional constitutionally-based assertions that the FISA proce-
dures for ex parte, in camera review violate due process have met with a similar lack of
success. See, e.g., United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
136 Duggan, 743 F.2d at 74-75.
137 Id..
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provisions of article III of the Constitution insofar as FISC proceedings
are entirely ex parte, because federal judges are not appointed to the
FISC for life and receive no additional compensation for their service in
that capacity.
138
Finally, the defendants asserted that the terms and conditions of
FISA had not been satisfied in their case since the surveillance was part
of a criminal, not national security, investigation.13 9 While the appeals
court recognized the requirement that the collection of foreign intelli-
gence be "the primary objective" of a FISA surveillance, it also noted
that the courts are intended to have a limited role in assessing the valid-
ity of the purpose asserted by the government in a particular case un-
less there is evidence of actual fraud on the court.140 The mere collec-
tion of information that may later be useful as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, even if foreseeable, does not undermine the legality of a
FISA surveillance so long as there is a certified foreign intelligence
purpose. 1" The court also noted that there is no requirement in FISA
to identify all the persons whose communications might be acquired in
the course of the surveillance of an appropriate target.1 42 Additional
minimization issues had been disposed of satisfactorily by the district
court.
1 43
A unique set of issues relating to FISA was raised in the case of
In re Kevork.'" The FISA electronic surveillance in Los Angeles that
resulted in terrorism charges in the United States'45 also revealed a
conspiracy to assassinate a Turkish official in Canada. 46 The three
individuals who were indicted in Canada moved to suppress evidence
obtained from the surveillance in the United States on the ground that
FISA bars disclosure of information acquired under the Act for use in a
foreign criminal proceeding. 147 A "commission," consisting of a United
States Federal District Court Judge and an Ontario Supreme Court
Justice, had been appointed by the District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California and the Supreme Court of Ontario, respectively, to
hear testimony and gather evidence.' The Attorney General author-
ized the production of information obtained through the FISA surveil-
138 Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1196-97.
139 Duggan, 743 F.2d at 76.
140 Id. at 77.
141 Id. at 78.
142 Id. at 79.
143 Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1195.
144 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986).
145 See id. at 568; United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
148 See In re Kevork, 788 F.2d at 568.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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lance and the three individuals were informed of the proposed use as
required by FISA.14 9
The individuals argued that FISA only speaks to federal, state, or
local criminal proceedings and that, absent express statutory authoriza-
tion, the introduction of evidence produced by electronic surveillance
was barred by Supreme Court decisions preceding FISA and the 1968
Omnibus Act. 50 The Ninth Circuit disagreed and found no indication
the issue had ever been raised, not to mention decided, by the courts. 51
Furthermore, Congress clearly had contemplated dissemination to for-
eign governments of intelligence information acquired through FISA
surveillance and there was no reason to believe its ultimate use in for-
eign judicial proceedings was intended to be barred. Thus, the suppres-
sion was denied.
Of course, despite the fact that the government has been successful
to date in these cases and in countering every type of judicial challenge
that has been raised to FISA, these issues will not be settled definitively
unless and until the Supreme Court is afforded an opportunity to rule
on the statute.1 52 Nonetheless, it is significant that the fundamental
constitutionality of the FISA process, the integrity with which it is be-
ing implemented, and the role of the FISC have withstood substantial
judicial scrutiny. This is not to say that there has been no controversy
regarding the implementation of FISA or that the statute could not be
improved by amendment in light of experience and changing
circumstances.
149 Id.; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), (e) (1982).
150 In re Kevork, 788 F.2d at 570. The appellants supported this contention by
citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338 (1939). Id.
"I In re Kevork, 788 F.2d at 570.
152 Id. Several other cases involving examination of issues raised in conjunction
with FISA surveillances are also noteworthy. In United States v. Hovsepian, CR 82-
917-MRP (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 25, 1985), for example, the District Court upheld the
use of automatic tape recorders instead of more selective human monitors because of the
likelihood the targets would use foreign or coded language. In Re: Grand Jury v.
(Under Seal), No. 88-5610 (4th Cir. filed Sept. 14, 1988), concluded that a grand jury
is not a "proceeding" requiring notice to witnesses of FISA surveillance. In United
States v. Chin, Crim. No. 85-263-A (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 29, 1986), the same judge
who applied the primary purpose test in the context of pre-FISA warrantless foreign
intelligence surveillance in United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912-13 (4th Cir.
1980), applied a similar mode of analysis to surveillance under FISA. In United States
v. Hawamda, Crim. No. 88-168-A (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 15, 1988), the same judge
upheld the legality of both a domestic FISA and non-FISA overseas electronic surveil-
lance for national security purposes.
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V. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT AND PHYSICAL SEARCHES
During the debate over FISA, there were those who argued that
the creation of the FISC would blur the constitutional lines of responsi-
bility in the area of national security activities, would encourage the
executive branch to undertake activities that might otherwise be inhib-
ited, and would create a judicial entity that would necessarily become a
captive of better informed and more experienced executive branch offi-
cials."5 3 Those who voiced these concerns were able to assert vindication
in late 1980 when the Justice Department disclosed that Attorney Gen-
eral Benjamin Civiletti had determined that requests for Attorney Gen-
eral approval of national security-related physical searches should be
brought to the FISC for judicial review in cases where such review
would not frustrate national security interests. This review would be
sought even though the Attorney General continued to believe that the
President retained the constitutional authority to approve such searches
without judicial review.'
54
The requests for FISC approval of physical searches for national
security purposes were patterned upon the procedures for electronic
surveillance under FISA and represented the first time that such mat-
ters had been submitted for prior judicial review.1 55 The premise for
the Attorney General's decision was that the FISC provided a judicial
forum with the security and expertise necessary for the review of such
matters.' 56 Since FISA clearly does not provide the requisite jurisdic-
tion, the Justice Department argued that the FISC judges drew author-
ity to review and approve physical searches for national security pur-
poses directly from their inherent constitutional power as federal judges
to ensure the integrity of the judicial process and to protect the fourth
amendment interests of the subjects of such searches, and from the All
Writs Act. 15 7 In 1980, the Department sought FISC approval of three
physical searches, and in each case the FISC judges granted it.'5 8
13 See, e.g., Hearings on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977
Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Permt. Select Comm. on Intelligence,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, 26-31, 125, 213-15, 226 (1978).
'" See Memorandum from Kenneth C. Bass III, Counsel for Intelligence Policy,
U.S. Department of Justice, to FBI Director William H. Webster, Oct. 14, 1980, re-
printed in HPSCI FISA Ra. 1466, supra note 117, at 8-16.
'5 See id. at 8-9.
146 See id. at 14-16.
157 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982) ("Except as otherwise provided by an Act of
Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or
proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof ex-
pressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress.").
'58 See SSCI FISA REP. 660, supra note 117, at 19 n.12.
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Both congressional intelligence committees expressed concern and
reservations when this use of the FISC was reported to them."89 The
FISC itself also harbored doubt as to its authority to review these mat-
ters, and directed the Clerk of the Court to develop a legal memoran-
dum on the subject for the judges. That memorandum, issued after the
three searches had been approved, concluded that neither the statutory
language nor the legislative history gave any indication that the Con-
gress intended to grant the FISC jurisdiction to authorize any activity
that did not constitute "electronic surveillance" as defined in the stat-
ute.160 The arguments concerning the inherent authority of federal
judges and the authority conferred by the All Writs Act were dismissed
as immaterial because all the sources that had been cited for this pro-
position were concerned with the powers of district court judges, not
district court judges sitting as a special court with very carefully limited
and defined jurisdiction."' 1
In the spring of 1981, following the transition to a new adminis-
tration under President Ronald Reagan and Attorney General William
French Smith, the Justice Department submitted another application to
the FISC for authority to conduct a national security-related physical
search." 2 This time, however, the Department sought to have the ap-
plication rejected and accompanied it with a memorandum of law that
argued that the FISC had no jurisdiction-explicit, implied, or inher-
ent-to grant such an order. 6
The Department argued that it was clear on the face of the statute
that FISA contemplated only electronic surveillance applications, and
that it was evident from the legislative history that physical searches
were intended to be dealt with by Congress at a later time. Thus, the
FISC had no express or implied jurisdiction over such matters. 6  As to
inherent power, the memorandum argued that inherent constitutional
authority to approve warrantless physical searches for national security
purposes rests with the President, so there was no constitutional neces-
' See HPSCI FISA REP. 1466, supra note 117, at 5 (committee report), 25-26
(additional views of members Robinson, Ashbrook, McClory, Whitehurst, and Young);
SSCI FISA REP. 1017, supra note 117, at 9-10.
160 See Memorandum to Presiding Judge George L. Hart, Jr. from Robert S.
Erdahl, October 30, 1980, reprinted in HPSCI FISA REP. 1466, supra note 117, at
17-24.
161 Id. at 21-24.
182 See SSCI FISA REP. 280, supra note 117.
163 See Memorandum of Applicant, In re Application of the United States for an
Order Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises and Personal Prop-
erty (For. Intell. Surv. Ct., June 11, 1981), reprinted in SSCI FISA RIP. 280, supra
note 117, app. b. at 10-16 [hereinafter Physical Search Memorandum].
16 See id. at 11.
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sity for the FISC to act to protect fourth amendment interests.'6 5 Based
on these arguments, the Justice Department asked the FISC in effect to
reverse its previous decisions and reject any claim to jurisdiction in
physical search cases.
Once again, the FISC agreed with the arguments of executive
branch lawyers. Presiding Judge Hart issued an opinion on June 11,
1981, concluding that the Court does not have, and presumably never
had, jurisdiction to approve physical searches. All the FISC judges con-
curred."6 ' The opinion did not treat the constitutional issues that had
been raised for accepting or rejecting jurisdiction over these activities,
but relied solely on the language and purposes of FISA.17 The Court
found it significant that the Senate had considered extensive amend-
ments to FISA in 1980 that would have expressly added physical
searches to the FISC's jurisdiction and changed the Act's title to the
"Foreign Intelligence Search and Surveillance Act." The amendments,
contained in S. 2284, were not passed, however. 6
Thus, the only denial by the FISC of any of the almost 4,300
requests made to it by the government during the first ten years of its
existance was issued at the request of the executive branch.
VI. LOOKING AHEAD - POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS TO FISA
After less than a year of experience under FISA, the executive
branch suggested that three amendments to the statute be considered.'
Subsequently, two additional amendments were suggested by the Exec-
utive. 170 These amendments included:
-adding language to make clear that the term "agent of a foreign
power" as used in FISA for targeting purposes includes individuals
who hold both United States and foreign citizenship and are serving as
senior officials in a foreign government;
-adding language to make clear that individuals who formerly
held senior positions in a foreign government may also be targeted;
-extending to 48 hours the 24-hour period allowed in FISA for
emergency surveillance while an application to the FISC is being
prepared;
-authorizing an exception to the strict FISA limits on use and
"I" Id. at 14-15.
... See Physical Search Memorandum, supra note 163, at 16-19.
167 Id.
le8 See id. at 18-19.
16I See SSCI FISA REP. 1017, supra note 117, at 6-9; HPSCI FISA REP. 1466,
supra note 117, at 4-5.
170 See SSCI FISA REP. 280, supra note 117, at 4-6.
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dissemination of information acquired during training, testing, or ef-
forts to protect against illegal electronic surveillance when the informa-
tion indicates threats to human life or physical safety;
-adding language to make clear that the authority granted the
Attorney General under FISA to approve electronic surveillance of for-
eign powers where there is no substantial likelihood of acquiring com-
munications of United States persons includes authority to approve
physical entry to premises as necessary to install, or remove listening
devices.
1 71
Congress has taken no action on these proposals. The Justice De-
partment, however, reversed its earlier position and concluded some
months subsequent to the transmittal of the proposed amendments that
FISA in fact does authorize the Attorney General to approve physical
entry when necessary to implement an electronic surveillance that the
statute allows to be approved by the Attorney General alone.'7 2 That
conclusion appears to have removed the need for this particular amend-
ment and was based upon the reasoning of an earlier Supreme Court
decision that utilized an analysis of not just the language, but also the
structure and history, of a statute to find implied power where reasona-
bly necessary to implement the statutory authority."73
The other proposed amendments have not been pursued with any
vigor by the Executive or the Congress.174 While this inaction seem-
ingly indicates a lack of urgency, it is apparent that these proposals
identify weaknesses in the law that may result in the loss of intelligence
in particular circumstances and should be addressed before those cir-
cumstances arise again.
For example, it is possible that an individual who attained perma-
nent resident alien status while living in the United States and then
returned to his native country could become the Prime Minister or
President of that country. If that person then visited the United States,
FISA could be interpreted not to allow for surveillance of his communi-
cations unless a connection to the foreign country's intelligence activities
could be established because the person would still be deemed a
"United States person".17 5 A foreign national who formerly held a sen-
ior position in a foreign country and is in the United States could be
171 Id. at 4-8.
172 Id.
173 See id. (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)).
174 An additional possible amendment was noted in 1982, i.e., reducing the ad-
ministrative burdens of FISA by allowing longer than 90 days for surveillance of for-
eign intelligence officers. See SSCI FISA REP. 691, supra note 117, at 5.
"7 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1) (1982) (defining "agent of a foreign power" and
"United States person").
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insulated from FISA targeting unless there was evidence of current ties
with a foreign political faction in that foreign country. This is a conse-
quence of the current definition of "agent of a foreign power".
176
FISA also must keep pace with the continuing explosion in com-
munications technologies available both to law enforcement agencies
and potential surveillance targets. FISA was drafted to take account of
experience and technology developed between 1968 and 1978, but the
decade since its passage has witnessed substantial technological changes
that could require amendments to FISA in order to extend its privacy
protections and to facilitate legitimate government interests that might
otherwise be frustrated.17 7 For instance, Congress saw a need in 1986
to make clear that the 1986 Omnibus Act applies to communications
over fiber optic cable, as well as traditional wire transmissions.7 '
Another example is the increasing number of businesses and other
organizations that are establishing private telephone systems for voice
and data communications that are not part of a common carrier net-
work.179 Although the 1968 Omnibus Act has been amended to include
such private systems within its requirements on interception,"' FISA
has not. 8"
In addition, it has been suggested that congressional and FISC
oversight of Executive minimization practices under FISA should be
enhanced. 8 2 The major difficulty with increasing the FISA Court's
role in supervision of minimization is the additional burdens that would
result. The judges are already devoting substantial amounts of time to
reviewing five to six hundred applications each year and might be
forced to abandon their regular district court positions if they must be-
gin to travel around the country visiting various locations where FISA
minimization takes place.' 8" The additional workload would still be
substantial if the records were required to be brought to the FISA
judges and such a requirement would result in mammoth administra-
176 See id.
177 Cf. REPORT OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 4952,
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (technological change left new forms of telecommunication un-
protected or uncertain as to protection. The 1968 Omnibus Act was enacted when most
telecommunication consisted of voice communications over common carrier networks).
178 Id.
178 See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1986).
10 See Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) § 101(a) (1) (amending defini-
tion of "wire communication"), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
181 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1) (1982) (definition of "wire communication" that is lim-
ited to common carrier services).
182 See Schwartz, supra note 121, at 433-90.
183 This problem has been recognized even by one of the chief proponents of en-
hanced minimization oversight. See id. at 448-49.
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tive and security problems for the implementing agencies. Similar diffi-
culties would be created if an increased congressional role were re-
quired in monitoring minimization practices as well as the substantial
separation of powers issues that arise whenever Congress seeks access
to ongoing investigative files.' An oversight system based on random
or sample reviews,18 5 might not address fundamental concerns because
it would provide no assurance of program-wide practices, and would
require much negotiation between the overseers and the intelligence
agencies concerning which files were to be reviewed and under what
conditions.'
The public's confidence in the integrity of the process could be
strengthened, however, by renewal of the statutory requirement, which
expired after FISA's first five years, that the Senate and House intelli-
gence committees issue annual reports regarding FISA's implementa-
tion. Apart from the episodic insights provided by judicial review and
criminal proceedings, these reports comprise essentially the only public
source of information regarding FISA practices and developments in
the administrative and judicial areas. 
8 7
Perhaps the most promising area for possible amendment of FISA,
however, is the recurring proposal to expand the FISC jurisdiction and
provide specific statutory authorization for review and approval of
physical searches for national security purposes. While the constitu-
tional authority of the Executive to conduct these activities without ju-
dicial involvement appears to be well-established,' 88 the same interests
underlying enactment of FISA itself - protecting individual rights
while facilitating legitimate government programs - would militate in
favor of a statutory framework for physical searches.
It may be argued, as has been done in the past, that vesting au-
thority in the FISC to approve the use of national security-related
18 See id. at 483-90.
185 See id. at 450-53 (recommending that the FISC conduct in-depth review of the
products and use of products in a few randomly-selected surveillances and that counsel
for the congressional committees be present to act as adversary of the intelligence agen-
cies). In this latter regard, it is interesting to note that the procedures utilized by the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service to obtain warrants for electronic surveillance for
intelligence purposes include a requirement that a Canadian Justice Department attor-
ney act as a "Devil's Advocate" to challenge such application. See Annual Report of the
Security Intelligence Review Committee 1987-1988, at 15.
188 Schwartz, however, proposed that the FISC have absolute discretion to ex-
amine any case it chooses. See id.
18 See 50 U.S.C. § 1808(b) (1982). For a comprehensive listing of the published
Senate and House reports, see supra note 117.
188 See Brown & Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intel-
ligence Purposes; Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CArH. U.
L. REV. 97, 107-37 (1985).
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physical searches is an unconstitutional intrusion into presidential pow-
ers.189 In response to this argument, it should be pointed out that FISA
has worked to the Executive's advantage in the area of electronic sur-
veillance despite similar concerns. The statutory foundation of these ac-
tivities, and the judicial role in them, has enhanced rather than dimin-
ished executive power because it protects the government officials who
are involved in these activities from civil or criminal liability and is
indispensible in encouraging cooperation from the private sector indi-
viduals and entities that must be involved if these activities are to be
successful. Further, a FISA amendment regarding physical searches
could facilitate access to tax and other records that now, by statute, may
be acquired only with a warrant based upon a full criminal stan-
dard.' 90 The prospect of extending FISA to physical searches has been
under consideration since before FISA became law"9' and there con-
tinue to be periodic indications of interest on the part of the Congress
in such legislation." 2 While development and negotiation of a statutory
framework for intelligence-related physical searches could be a chal-
lenging and grueling process, it would appear from the successful im-
plementation of FISA that the benefits of public assurance and clear
governmental authority would be well worth the effort.
"I" See supra notes 93-94, 125 and accompanying text. Similar arguments can
also be expected to be raised, with added vigor, with regard to another potential area
for FISA coverage that was put off originally by Congress but will likely grow in
importance as technological change heightens the need for statutory authority; intercep-
tion of international communications of United persons who are in the United States.
See H.R. REP. No. 1293, Pt. I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28, 50-51 (1978).
190 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i) (1982) (tax return information); 39 U.S.C.
§ 3623(d) (opening of mail).
191 In the late 1970s, an effort to develop a comprehensive oversight charter for
the entire intelligence community included the provisions that ultimately became FISA
but also would have provided the FISC with authority to approve physical searches for
national security purposes. See Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the United States Senate on S. 2525, the National Intelligence Reorganization and
Reform Act of 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 973-1016 (1978). See also J. OSETH, REGU-
LATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: A STUDY IN DEFINITION OF THE NA-
TIONAL INTEREST 107-112, 122-48 (1985). Ultimately, the only portion of this enor-
mous legislative effort that was enacted related solely to legislative oversight of
intelligence activities. 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1982). See J.OSETH, supra, at 133-48; A.B.A.
Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Oversight and Accountability of
the U.S. Intelligence Agencies: An Evaluation 11 (1985).
192 See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, MEETING THE ESPIONAGE CHALLENGE: A REVIEW OF UNITED STATES
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAMS, S. REP. No. 522, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54, 56 (1986); SSCI FISA REP. 660, supra note 117, at 17-20; SSCI FISA REP.
691, supra note 121, at 5-6.
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CONCLUSION
It may be said with assurance that FISA has proven over its ten-
year lifetime to have been a very successful experiment in national se-
curity legislation. As William Webster, then FBI Director, now Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, testified shortly after FISA was enacted,
"We have had occasion to test most aspects of the statute and have
found them to permit necessary intelligence collection. We are con-
vinced that it provided our personnel with the assurance that their ac-
tivities today will withstand challenge in the future."'9 3
The Executive has obtained over four thousand surveillance orders
from the FISC, allowing it to pursue activities it believed served the
national security interests of the United States. Neither Congress nor
the courts have found any basis for concluding that these surveillances
have involved abuse of the statute, thus giving the public substantial
assurance that individual rights are not being trammeled in pursuit of
national security. The government agents and the private sector person-
nel who are involved in the conduct of these surveillances are able to
rely upon judicial approval, thus protecting themselves from civil or
criminal liability in performing their duties. These benefits support
amending FISA so that it remains effective during the next ten years in
the face of change and so a broader range of intelligence operations,
including intelligence-related physical searches, can be brought under
its authority.
"Is SSCI FISA REP. 660, supra note 117, at 4.
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